Reflective Equilibrium
Iterative adjustment between principles and considered judgments until coherence is reached.
Reflective Equilibrium is the methodological framework articulated by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) for justifying moral and political principles through iterative adjustment between general principles and considered particular judgments until they reach mutual coherence. The method's structure: begin with considered judgments (particular moral intuitions held with relative certainty under conditions favoring careful reflection — not snap reactions or socially-pressured views); articulate candidate principles that account for those judgments; identify cases where principles conflict with considered judgments; revise either principles or judgments (whichever is more reasonable to revise in the specific case) and iterate. 'Wide' reflective equilibrium, distinguished from narrow, additionally considers competing background theories (philosophical, social-scientific) that inform both principles and judgments, with all three levels mutually adjusting. The framework descends from Nelson Goodman's Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955) account of justifying inductive principles and is closely related to coherentist epistemology more generally. Reflective equilibrium is now the dominant methodological framework in normative ethics, political philosophy, and applied ethics, even where its specific commitments are contested. Critics argue it provides too much latitude (almost any principle can be made to fit suitably-revised judgments), defends starting points (considered judgments) that may themselves be culturally biased, or risks circular reasoning.
Core components
- Considered judgments (particular intuitions held under careful reflection)
- General principles (candidate accounts of those judgments)
- Iterative mutual adjustment
- Narrow vs wide reflective equilibrium (wide includes background theories)
- Distinction from foundationalism (no privileged starting point)
- Connection to coherentism in epistemology
- Application across normative ethics, political philosophy, and applied ethics
- Distinction between considered judgments and mere intuitions or socially-shaped reactions
Primary use case
Methodology in normative ethics, political philosophy, and applied ethics; foundation for Rawls's derivation of his principles of justice; widely-used framework in bioethics, business ethics, and other applied fields; basis for arguments about how to balance theoretical principles against case-specific intuitions; pedagogical framework for ethics teaching.
Common criticisms
- Considered judgments may themselves be culturally biased — the method's bootstrap problem is that we can only start from where we are, and where we are may be substantially mistaken
- circular reasoning concern: principles are tested against judgments that we've already adjusted to fit principles
- unclear when iteration should stop — equilibrium is rarely complete and final
- doesn't adequately distinguish good revisions of judgments (in light of better principles) from bad revisions (rationalizing comfortable principles)
- wide reflective equilibrium adds more degrees of freedom but also more potential for justification through preferred-theory selection
- can become a cover for confirming pre-existing views by selectively adjusting judgments
- some critics argue the method is a dressed-up appeal to intuition with extra steps.
Lineage
- Siblings
- Coherentism, Foundationalism