Foundationalism
Knowledge structure resting on basic non-inferentially justified beliefs.
Foundationalism is the epistemological position that the structure of justified belief and knowledge is hierarchical, with non-inferentially justified 'basic' beliefs at the foundation supporting derivatively justified beliefs through inferential relations. The motivating problem is the regress of justification: if every belief requires another belief to justify it, the chain either continues forever (problematic), circles (also problematic), or terminates in beliefs that don't require further justification — foundationalism takes the third option. The tradition includes classical foundationalism (Descartes, Locke, classical empiricists, classical rationalists) holding that basic beliefs are infallibly self-evident or immediately given in experience; modest foundationalism (contemporary articulations including BonJour, Audi, Plantinga's reformed epistemology) accepting fallible non-inferential justification; and Reformed Epistemology (Plantinga, Wolterstorff) extending foundationalism to religious belief by arguing belief in God can be 'properly basic.' Foundationalism stands in opposition to coherentism (which denies the asymmetric structure between basic and derivative beliefs) and is in tension with reflective equilibrium and pragmatism. The position has been substantially under siege since the mid-20th century — Sellars's critique of the 'myth of the given', Quine's holistic critique of analyticity, and substantial coherentist alternatives have all challenged classical foundationalism — but more modest variants remain prominent in contemporary epistemology.
Core components
- Basic beliefs (non-inferentially justified)
- Derivative beliefs (inferentially justified by basic beliefs)
- Asymmetric justification structure
- Solution to regress problem
- Classical foundationalism (infallibility of basic beliefs)
- Modest foundationalism (fallible non-inferential justification)
- Reformed epistemology (Plantinga's properly basic religious belief)
- Distinction from coherentism (denies asymmetric structure)
- Internalism vs externalism cuts across foundationalism
Primary use case
Foundational epistemological position in analytic philosophy; framework for thinking about epistemic justification structure; foundation for many specific epistemologies (perceptual, mathematical, religious); reference framework in philosophy of religion (Plantinga); teaching tool in epistemology education; basis for arguments about which beliefs deserve foundational status.
Common criticisms
- Sellars's 'myth of the given' (1956): the supposed non-inferentially justified perceptual beliefs are not pure given but already conceptually structured, undermining classical foundationalism
- Quine-Duhem holism: beliefs are tested in webs, not individually, undermining the basic/derivative distinction
- difficulty specifying what makes a belief properly basic without arbitrariness
- classical foundationalism's infallibility requirements are not met by any actual human beliefs
- Plantinga's expansion of properly basic to include religious beliefs has been argued to make the framework permit too much
- coherentist and pragmatist alternatives offer different structures that some argue better account for actual epistemic practice
- tension with reliabilism and externalist alternatives
- modest foundationalism may concede so much to non-foundational considerations that it loses distinct content.
Lineage
- Siblings
- Coherentism, Reliabilism