Cultural Relativism
Boasian principle: cultures must be understood on their own terms, not judged by external standards.
Cultural Relativism is the foundational principle of American anthropology articulated by Franz Boas (German-American anthropologist, founder of American academic anthropology at Columbia University from 1899) and substantially developed through his students including Ruth Benedict (Patterns of Culture 1934), Margaret Mead (Coming of Age in Samoa 1928), Melville Herskovits (Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism 1972), and others. The framework's central commitments include: (1) cultures should be studied and understood on their own terms, in their own contexts, rather than evaluated against external (especially Western) standards; (2) substantial cross-cultural variation in beliefs, practices, and values reflects substantial human cultural diversity rather than developmental hierarchy from primitive to civilized; (3) ethical and epistemic claims are substantially shaped by cultural context, complicating universal-standard claims. Boas's foundational anthropology emerged in substantial opposition to 19th-century evolutionist anthropology (Edward Tylor, Lewis Henry Morgan, others ranking cultures on developmental ladder) and to scientific racism (Boas substantially produced empirical evidence against racial-IQ hierarchies and racial-cultural correlations). The framework substantially shaped 20th-century anthropology and broader intellectual culture, providing antiracist intellectual foundations for civil-rights movements and substantial cross-cultural understanding. Cultural relativism distinguishes between methodological relativism (suspending judgment for analytical purposes during ethnographic study) and ethical/normative relativism (the stronger claim that no cross-cultural ethical judgments are possible). The stronger normative version has been substantially contested — most contemporary anthropologists endorse methodological relativism while debating how to balance respect for cultural particularity against universal human-rights commitments, particularly regarding practices like female genital cutting, honor killing, child marriage, and other practices where cultural context and human rights are substantially in tension.
Core components
- Cultures understood on their own terms
- Distinction from external standards (especially Western)
- Critique of 19th-century evolutionist anthropology
- Antiracist intellectual foundation
- Methodological vs ethical/normative relativism distinction
- Substantial American anthropology institutionalization through Boas's Columbia department
- Connection to broader hermeneutic and humanistic traditions
- Foundation for ethnographic method
- Distinction from Universalism
- Substantial 20th-century influence on civil-rights and cross-cultural understanding
Primary use case
Foundational framework in American anthropology and broader humanistic social science; basis for substantial 20th-century anthropological research; reference framework in anthropology education globally; foundation for ethnographic methodology; integration with broader humanistic and antiracist intellectual traditions; pedagogical foundation in anthropology curricula; influence on cross-cultural understanding, intercultural communication, international relations, multicultural education; foundation for some commercial cross-cultural consulting and training.
Common criticisms
- The strong normative version (no cross-cultural ethical judgments possible) has been substantially contested — most contemporary anthropologists endorse methodological relativism while finding strong ethical relativism untenable when confronted with practices like female genital cutting, honor killing, child marriage, slavery, genocide
- tension with universal human rights commitments has been substantively unresolved — the substantial 1947 American Anthropological Association statement against the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which Herskovits substantially drafted) has been contested by subsequent anthropologists who find the strong-relativist position untenable
- cultural relativism can be weaponized to defend practices that substantively harm community members (women, children, dissidents) by appeal to cultural authenticity
- the framework's emphasis on cultural boundedness understates the substantial cross-cultural moral universals that empirical anthropology has documented (incest taboos, prohibition of murder, basic notions of fairness)
- commercial 'cultural sensitivity' training often invokes cultural relativism without engaging substantive philosophical complexity
- integration with universalist political philosophies (liberal democracy, human rights) is genuinely difficult
- tendency for cultural relativism rhetoric to coexist with substantive universalist practice in academia and policy
- cross-cultural application is itself contested — what counts as 'a culture' for relativist purposes involves substantial interpretive choice
- recent anthropology has substantially complicated cultural-boundedness through globalization, migration, hybridity, and transcultural dynamics that the framework's discrete-cultures framing underweights.
Lineage
- Siblings
- Structural Anthropology, Interpretive Anthropology, Cultural Materialism