Contractualism

framework · philosophy · philosophical-tradition

Scanlon's view that moral principles are those no one could reasonably reject.

Contractualism is the family of moral theories grounding moral norms in what could be the object of agreement among rational, reasonable parties. The two principal contemporary articulations descend from different lineages. T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other (1998) articulates moral wrongness as 'an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.' Scanlon's contractualism is grounded in the value of justifiability to others — moral principles must be defensible to each affected party individually, blocking aggregation in ways utilitarianism permits. John Rawls's contractualism, developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), uses the device of the original position with the veil of ignorance to derive principles of justice. Contractualism shares with deontology a focus on the right rather than the good and a non-aggregative structure, but grounds duty in interpersonal justifiability rather than pure rationality (Kant). Critics argue contractualism inherits aggregation problems in disguised form and struggles with non-human animals and future generations who cannot reasonably reject anything.

Originators

T.M. Scanlon (contemporary contractualism); John Rawls (precursor through A Theory of Justice); historical antecedents in social contract theory (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant) high

Year / Decade

1971 (Rawls); 1998 (Scanlon What We Owe); historical contract theory traditions high

Primary sources

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice, Scanlon, T.M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other high

Core components

Moral principles as those no one could reasonably reject
Justifiability to each affected party as foundational
Distinction from utility aggregation
Personal vs impersonal complaints in Scanlon's framework
Connection to Rawls's original position and veil of ignorance
Non-aggregative structure (helping the many at substantial cost to one is hard to justify)
Distinction from Hobbesian self-interest contractarianism

Primary use case

Normative ethical theory; political philosophy and theory of justice; bioethics with strong concerns about aggregation (treatment rationing); applied ethics where individual justifiability matters; basis for arguments against aggregative utilitarianism in particular hard cases.

Common criticisms

'Reasonable rejection' is contested — what counts as a reasonable basis for rejection is itself a moral question that the framework needs to answer without circularity
struggles with future generations and non-human animals (who cannot reasonably reject anything)
aggregation problems return in disguised form (when many small harms could justify a large benefit, contractualism's individualism may produce counterintuitive results)
Parfit's argument that contractualism, properly understood, converges with consequentialism reduces its distinctive claims
contractualism inherits some of deontology's action-guidance limitations
'principles no one could reasonably reject' is a high bar that may not yield determinate answers in specific cases.

Lineage

Siblings: Deontology, Veil of Ignorance, Consequentialism